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Since 1989, seven countries in Eastern Europe have under-
taken the transition from one-party rule to constitutional democ-
racy: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Yugoslavia. Six of the seven are currently rewriting
their constitutions. The exception is Hungary, although that coun-
try's constitution is very much a patchwork, and new constitu-
tional efforts can be expected there, too, within the next few years.
In addition, several of the constituent republics are writing or re-
vising their constitutions, including the Czech and the Slovak
Lands in Czechoslovakia and Croatia and Slovenia in Yugoslavia.
Finally, the German Democratic Republic had made some progress
toward creating a new constitution before the process was over-
taken by unification. Altogether, therefore, we are dealing with at
least a dozen constitution-making processes.
This wave of constitution-making is not altogether unique. In
the late 1700s, the individual American states, the United States
itself, and France enacted a series of democratic constitutions. The
wave of revolutions in 1848 also included brief constitutional epi-
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sodes. After World War I, many of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states set up new constitutions that, with the exception of
Czechoslovakia, were not destined to last for long. After World
War II, Italy, West Germany, and Japan created democratic con-
stitutions.1 In the 1960s, a number of former British and French
colonies in Africa became independent and enacted new constitu-
tions. In the mid-1970s, Greece, Portugal, and Spain created new
constitutions that broke with the authoritarian past.2
Such precedents notwithstanding, the current wave stands out
in the following respects. First, all these countries have emerged
from communist rule. Second, they all have pre-communist consti-
tutional traditions.3 Third, along with political modernization, they
are all undertaking simultaneous transitions from central planning
to a market economy.4 Fourth, the histories of the countries are
tightly intertwined, creating a stock of common memories-and
common animosities.6 Finally, the developments of 1989 can be
seen as a snowballing process in which events in one country in-
spired and accelerated those in others.
Although both similar and interconnected, the countries and
their paths to democracy also differ in a number of ways. Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia are federally organized, whereas the other
five countries have a unitary state. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland are in some vague yet recognizable sense more ad-
vanced-both economically and culturally-than the group of Bal-
kan countries. An important explanatory variable may be the de-
gree of repression during communist rule. On this scale, the
countries may be tentatively ranked in the following order, from
1 For good studies of the West German and Japanese cases, see Peter H. Merkl, The
Origin of the West German Republic (Oxford, 1963); Kyoko Inoue, MacArth~ur's Japanese
Constitution (Chicago, 1991).
2 For a good study of the Spanish case, which also provides useful comparative perspec-
tives, see Andrea Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Consti-
tution-making (Westview, 1987).
3 True, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, none of the countries enjoyed constitu-
tional democracy over the whole period between the two wars. Nevertheless, the constitu-
tions that were in effect during part of this period remain important models and sources of
inspiration for today's constitution-makers in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Romania. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
' For an analysis of the problems posed by this simultaneous transition, see Adam
Przeworski, Political and Economic Reforms: Democracy and Market in Eastern Europe
and Latin America ch 4 (Cambridge, forthcoming 1991). For a brief discussion of the inter-
action between economic and political transition see also Jon Elster, When Communism
dissolves, London Rev Books 3, 4-5 (Jan 25, 1990).
1 A good overview of the whole region, with emphasis on the shifting traditions of con-
flicts and alliances, is Henry Bogdan, Histoire des pays de lEst (Perrin, 1990).
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less to more severe: Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Alba-
nia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia (after 1968), and Romania." In
all countries, the issue of ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities
is important, but the patterns differ dramatically.7 In Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, the transi-
tion to democracy was negotiated through Round Table Talks
(RTT), whereas Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia followed differ-
ent paths.
Under these conditions, the constitution-making processes in
Eastern Europe amount to a gigantic natural experiment. The
countries in question present an optimal degree of diversity for
comparative analysis: they are neither too similar nor too different.
The focus of comparison is twofold. On the one hand, one can ex-
amine the processes of constitution-making. On the other hand,
one can study and compare the outcome of these processes. My
main interest, as a political scientist, is in the former issue: the
blend of arguing and bargaining, threats and warnings, appeal to
tradition, borrowing from abroad, and influence of extra-constitu-
tional forces that characterizes the processes now under way in
Eastern Europe.8 First, I will give a brief overview of the national-
ist, linguistic, and religious dynamics of the region that pervade
the reform process. Then I will sketch out the events that led up to
the current wave of constitution-writing, focusing on the condi-
tions that made reform possible and on the processes by which the
countries moved away from communist rule. Finally, I shall con-
sider the constitution-making efforts in the various countries, with
special emphasis on the issues being discussed and the processes
being used to reach decisions on those issues.
' Given the multi-dimensionality of oppression, a ranking of this sort may be close to
meaningless. The complexity of the historical record provides an additional reason for being
skeptical. I believe, however, that it is important to reflect on this issue. The perceived
brutality of the former regime will determine how much opposition there will be to the
former elite obtaining positions of economic privilege. It will also determine the strength of
claims for retribution against that former elite as well as the risk and scope of witch hunt-
ing. One should not automatically assume that these problems will be less serious in the
"advanced" countries than in the "backward" ones. It might seem surprising to rank Czech-
oslovakia above Bulgaria and Albania on the scale of repression. I am not claiming, however,
that there was more tolerance of opposition in those countries; rather, there was less oppres-
sion because there was less opposition.
7 See notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
3 For a fuller discussion, see Jon Elster, Born to be Immortal: The Constitution-Mak-
ing Process (Cooley Lectures, University of Michigan, Apr 15-17, 1991) (on file with U Chi L
Rev).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGION: NATIONALISM,
LANGUAGE, AND RELIGION
All over Eastern Europe, ethnic, linguistic, and religious issues
are matters of intense conflict. They inform all political decision-
making. In the constitutional context, they impinge on the organi-
zation of individual rights, and-in the federal countries-on the
organization of government. To some extent, these conflicts are
over clear-cut issues such as the right to use one's own language in
dealings with the administration. More frequently, however, the
strife is largely symbolic and historical in character. The conflicts
between Czechs and Slovaks or between Serbs and Croats do not
arise because one of these groups interferes with the exercise of the
linguistic or religious rights of the other.9 Rather, they are caused
by hostility and suspicions that go back for decades, centuries, or
even millenia.
To impose some structure on the problem, let us define a na-
tion as a political entity that is recognized by other countries and
by international organizations; a republic as a political entity that
has some autonomy (minimally defined by having its own constitu-
tion and assembly) within a nation; and a people as a community
with common traditions, common language, common religion,
and-perhaps most important-common enemies. A political en-
tity (nation or republic) is homogeneous if (i) it contains only one
people and (ii) negligibly few members of that people live outside
the entity. It is internally heterogeneous if it contains non-negligi-
ble numbers of members of several peoples, and externally hetero-
geneous if it has one dominant people, and non-negligible numbers
of that people live outside its borders. Tentatively, I suggest the
hypotheses that internal heterogeneity is divisive, while external
heterogeneity is unifying.' °
In Eastern Europe, Poland is the most internally homogeneous
country, with Poles making up 95 percent of the population." A
vocal minority of 250,000 Poles lives in Lithuania; otherwise, Po-
land is externally homogeneous.
9 An exception is the complaint by Croats that Serbs use their clout over state televi-
sion to broadcast the most popular American programs with Cyrillic subtitles.
20 Evidence for the first hypothesis is provided in Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Charles Merrill,
1972). Evidence for the second might be found by looking at the role of Alsace-Lorraine in
French politics between 1871 and 1914 or that of Rhineland in German politics after 1918.
" The following data are taken from Vladimir V. Kusin, The Ethnic Factor, Report on
Eastern Europe 34 (Nov 9, 1990).
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Hungary is externally heterogeneous: two million Hungarian
speakers live in the Transylvanian region of Romania, some
600,000 in the Slovak Lands of Czechoslovakia, and about 500,000
in Yugoslavia. Altogether, almost 30 percent of the Hungarian-
speaking population lives outside Hungary. Internally, Hungary is
fairly homogeneous: about 93 percent of the population has Hun-
garian as their main language.
Albania, too, is externally heterogeneous, with 1.8 million
speakers of Albanian in Kossovo (a region of Yugoslovia), some in
other parts of Yugoslavia, and some in Greece. The Albanian Re-
publican Party (the second largest party in the opposition) has
unification of all Albanians as its main program, with an eagle with
one wing clipped as its emblem. About 93 percent of the popula-
tion in Albania has Albanian as its main language.
Romania is externally heterogeneous: the Soviet Republic of
Moldavia is 65 percent ethnic Romanian and might join Romania
were it to become independent from the Soviet Union. Romania is
also internally heterogeneous, containing about two million Hun-
garians (10 percent of the total population).
Bulgaria is internally heterogeneous, containing about a mil-
lion Turkish-speaking Muslims (about 10 percent of the total pop-
ulation) and 200,000 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.
Czechoslovakia is internally heterogeneous, with five million
Slovaks and ten million Czechs. The Czechs and Slovaks are di-
vided partly by religion (Catholicism is more important in
Slovakia) but mainly by historical traditions. As indicated above,
Slovakia is itself internally heterogeneous due to a sizeable ethnic
Hungarian population. Within the Czech Lands, there is also some
opposition between Bohemia on the one hand and Moravia and
Silesia on the other. This split has led to the suggestion to create a
tripartite federal republic, which would be less likely to tear itself
apart than a bi-republican state.
Yugoslavia is the most internally heterogeneous country in
Eastern Europe, with divisions along linguistic as well as religious
lines. Thus the 1.7 million Slovenes and 4.4 million Croats have
the same religion, but different languages; the Croats and the eight
million Serbs have the same language but different religions (and a
tradition of violent conflict); and of the more than four million
Muslims, half speak Albanian (in Kossovo) and half speak
Serbocroatian (in Bosnia). Serbia is both internally heterogeneous
(due to the Albanians in Kossovo) and externally heterogeneous
(due to the 600,000 Serbs in Croatia). Kossovo itself has a 10 per-
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cent Serbian minority, which is therefore a subgroup within a sub-
group within a subgroup of Yugoslavia.
An important variable is the geographical distribution of eth-
nic groups within the various regions. Members of the Turkish mi-
nority in Bulgaria are a majority of the population in the commu-
nities where they live. By contrast, the Serbs in Croatia and the
Hungarians in Transylvania rarely form more than 50 percent of
their local communities. 12 Such variations in density constrain the
demands that minority groups can plausibly make. These demands
can range from secession to linguistic autonomy.
Often, the most explosive political issue is not that of minori-
ties, but that of minorities within minorities. Indeed, alliances may
arise between a majority and a minority-within-a-minority even
when they belong to different groups. For example, the Hungarians
in Slovakia and the Czech majority both opposed attempts to
make Slovak the compulsory language in- official dealings in
Slovakia. The alliance is obviously more likely to emerge if the ma-
jority and the minority-within-a-minority belong to the same
group, as in the relation between Serbia and the Serbs in Kossovo.
There are two ways, then, in which the geographical distribu-
tion of minorities can be an obstacle to their demands for self-de-
termination. The presence of minorities within minorities ensures
that a republic will meet internal resistance if it tries to declare
itself autonomous, in addition to the predictable external resis-
tance. This problem is illustrated by Kossovo. The presence of low-
density minorities excludes territorial reorganization as a solution,
as illustrated by the Serbs in Croatia. In such cases, the only "solu-
tions" are mass migration, mass deportation (such as those carried
out in many Eastern European countries after World War II13), or
genocide.
Gypsies play a special role in Eastern Europe. 4 Because of
their mobile way of life, they are hard to count and not well-organ-
ized. Official figures have been much too low. In Romania, esti-
mates of Gypsy population now range from one to three million.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria may each have 700,000 or
more. Gypsies present a growing problem, as their natural rate of
increase is much higher than that of most other groups.
'2 Bogdan, Histoire des pays de l'Est at 497 (cited in note 5); see also Trond Gilberg,
Nationalism & Communism in Romania 167 (Westview, 1990).
" Bogdan, Histoire des pays de lEst at 390-92 (cited in note 5).
14 The following draws on Simon Simonov, The Gypsies: A Re-emerging Minority, Re-
port on Eastern Europe 12 (May 25, 1990).
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In some countries, the minorities are economically worse off
than the majorities. This is the case, notably, of the Slovaks in
Czechoslovakia and the Serbs in Croatia. In other countries the
minorities, even if not actually better off today, might have a
greater wealth potential in a market economy. The Turkish minor-
ity in Bulgaria has an advantage by virtue of cultivating the fertile
tobacco lands in the South. Hungarians in Transylvania claim that
their greater entrepreneurial skill will enable them to rise to the
top. Each case-poor minorities and rich minorities-could exacer-
bate social conflicts.
The hypothesis that internal heterogeneity is divisive is amply
confirmed in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The hypothesis that external heterogeneity is unifying seems to re-
ceive some confirmation in Serbia and in Albania. In addition to
the passions generated by ethnic cleavages, two other sources of
social conflict should be mentioned. First, in almost all Eastern
European countries there are or are likely to be demands for retri-
bution against the former nomenklatura. These demands will be
reinforced if, as is happening in several countries, the former com-
munists also turn out to be the new economic elite. Second, any
economic elite is likely to be met with resentment and suspicion. It
may well turn out that the most lasting legacy of communism will
be a deep-seated egalitarian feeling in the population. Political de-
velopments all over Eastern Europe are likely to be heavily shaped
by this potent mix of hatred, vengefulness, and envy.
II. THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM
A. The Preconditions
One can argue (but hardly prove) that the emergence of con-
stitutional or constitution-making democracies in Eastern Europe
was the outcome of three independent causes, none of which was
sufficient but each of which was necessary.
First, Gorbachev's triple policy of glasnost, perestroika, and
non-interference (abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine) was a
crucial factor. In East Germany, the population must have per-
ceived that the communist regime was in trouble when the govern-
ment banned Soviet magazines from the newsstands. The "eco-
glasnost" movement that was at the origin of reform in Bulgaria
clearly drew on the Soviet experience, as a source of legitimacy if
not of inspiration. 15 More importantly, of course, Gorbachev sent a
15 It is worth noting that environmental groups were also at the origin of the radicaliza-
tion of the Hungarian opposition. See Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, Remaking the Politi-
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signal not only to the East Germans but to all Eastern European
countries when, during the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary
of the German Democratic Republic, he told Erich Honecker that
"[t]hose being late will be punished by life itself"-an apparent
reference to political and economic reforms."6  Before that
date-October 7, 1989-there was room for genuine fear of Soviet
intervention. During the Polish RTT, for instance, Geremek re-
jected the proposal for completely free elections on the grounds
that it was too radical for the Soviets. 17 After Gorbachev's speech,
the fear of Soviet intervention rapidly abated, especially as mass
rally after mass rally, in country after country, went unpunished.
The second independent mover of events was the set of Round
Table Talks in Poland. First, they created a model for informal
talks between the regime and the opposition for other countries to
follow. In the Hungarian RTT, for instance, the opposition was in
contact with its Polish counterparts. In addition, the elections fol-
lowing the Polish RTT must have had an immense, demoralizing
effect on the communist regimes in other countries. Finally, the
fact of Soviet non-intervention created a new set of prior expecta-
tions for the subsequent transitions.
A third and less well-known factor was the ironic causal circle
beginning and ending in Romania."5 Ceaucescu's brutal treatment
of the Hungarian minority created a constant pressure on the bor-
der towards Hungary. Until June 1989, Hungary refused to accept
the Romanians who escaped across the border. When the Hun-
garian authorities changed their policy, they soon discovered that
taking in refugees is costly and applied to the United Nations for
financial aid. The Hungarians received the aid on the condition
that they sign the UN Convention on Refugees, which requires
states to harbor refugees who may face persecution in their home
country. That convention, however, was incompatible with Hun-
gary's bilateral agreement with East Germany that required each
state to extradite to the other those charged with criminal behav-
cal Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition, in
Ivo Banac, ed, Eastern Europe in Revolution (Cornell, forthcoming 1991).
11 Serge Schmemann, Security Forces Storm Protesters in East Germany, NY Times
Al (Oct 9, 1989).
17 Wiktor Osiatynski, The Round Table Negotiations in Poland 34 (Working Paper,
Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago
Law School, 1991).
11 I am indebted to Wiktor Osiatynski for pointing to this mechanism. See Wiktor
Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U Chi L Rev 823, 838 (1991).
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ior, such as illegal border crossings. 19 Thus, when the East German
refugees arrived at Hungary's border soon after the Romanians,
Hungary decided to admit them and let them leave for Austria on
their way to West Germany. The ensuing exodus was a major fac-
tor in the downfall of the East German regime. The next domino
to fall was Czechoslovakia in November 1989, and with the fall of
Ceaucescu in December, events had come full circle.
B. The Transition
In five of eight countries (including East Germany), the transi-
tion to democracy was negotiated through RTT between the Com-
munist Party ° (together with various satellites and pseudo-inde-
pendent organizations) and a more or less well-organized
opposition. I shall consider the transition in these countries first,
and then turn to the transition in the other countries.
1. The Round Table Talks.
The outcome of the talks shaped the constitutional develop-
ments in two ways. First, the agreements reached on electoral laws
in several cases shaped the composition of the constituent assem-
bly. Second, constitutional revisions agreed upon in the RTT may
survive in later constitutions. Rather than recounting the story of
each RTT,2 ' I shall point out some salient similarities and
differences.
A classical framework for comparing the conduct of the RTT
in each country is a four-actor model. 2 Within the regime, there
" Radio Free Europe Background Report 139 (Aug 4, 1989).
20 To facilitate the task of the reader, I refer to "the Communist Party" even when the
official name of the party was or is different (many of the communist parties changed their
name during the transition). I am also assuming, somewhat controversially perhaps, that the
National Salvation Front in Romania is little more than a continuation of the former Com-
munist Party.
21 For details of the RTT in Hungary, see Bruszt and Stark, Remaking the Political
Field in Hungary (cited in note 15), as well as Andras Sajo, Round Tables in Hungary
(Working Paper, Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, 1991). For Poland, see Osiatynski, The Round Table Negotia-
tions in Poland (cited in note 17). For East Germany, see Ulrich Preuss, The (Central)
Round Table in the Former German Democratic Republic (Working Paper, Center for the
Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago Law School,
1991), as well as Uwe Thaysen, Der Runde Tisch Oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der
DDR in die Demohratie (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990). The Center for the Study of Consti-
tutionalism in Eastern Europe will issue a Working Paper by Rumyana Kolarova and Dim-
itr Dimitrov on the RTT in Bulgaria.
2 See notably Przeworski, Political and Economic Reforms at ch 2 (cited in note 4).
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can be hardliners and reformers. Within the opposition, there can
be moderates and radicals. The real negotiations take place be-
tween reformers and moderates. Hardliners and radicals are
"quasi-actors" rather than full-fledged strategic actors: they serve
as resources for, respectively, reformers and moderates. At any
given point in the negotiations, one party may refer to its more
extreme allies when issuing threats or warnings, where threats take
the form of "if you do X, I shall make my allies do Y," and where
warnings take the form of "if you do X, my allies will do Y." Many
statements issued as warnings are, of course, threats in disguise.
And to the extent that the statements genuinely are warnings, they
may be true by virtue of prior actions taken for the purpose of
making them true. In this case, we may refer to them as pseudo-
warnings. When the Communists say "If you do X, the Soviets will
come," they may really mean "If you do X, we shall ask the Soviets
to come." When the moderates in opposition say, "If you do X, our
radical faction will take to the streets," the warning may be true by
virtue of earlier, inflammatory statements issued for this purpose.
We need to distinguish, in other words, between four cases: (i)
Genuine threats: If you go in that direction, I shall fire a shot that
will- wake up a lion that will kill you; (ii) Genuine warnings: If you
go in that direction, you will wake up a lion; (iii) Disguised threats:
If you go in that direction, my hot-tempered friends will fire a shot
that will wake up a lion; and (iv) Pseudo-warnings: If you go in
that direction, you will wake up a lion that I put in place there last
night.
The Polish RTT were the only talks with the full complement
of actors. In Bulgaria, there were only two actors: the hardliners
had been eliminated by the time the RTT began, and the opposi-
tion had too little structure to allow for a differentiation between
moderates and radicals. Although the Bulgarian opposition could
and did play on the threat or -varning of mass demonstrations,
those who took to the streets did not constitute an organized fac-
tion with well-defined aims of its own.
In Hungary, the transition involved three actors: hardliners,
reformers, and a fairly undifferentiated opposition. Although the
groups in the opposition did break up toward the end of the talks,
they succeeded in preventing the regime from manipulating and
exploiting their internal differences. In the Czechoslovak and East
German RTT, the process was not so much one of negotiation as
one of unilateral imposition: there was only one actor-the unified
opposition.
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Stepping outside the four-actor model, Western governments
played an important role in the Polish and Hungarian cases. A ma-
jor reason why the Polish Communist Party wanted negotiations in
the first place was the need for Western credit, which they could
not get unless Solidarity helped them to provide a minimal level of
democratic legitimacy.23 In Hungary, the strategy of the hardliners
was constrained for similar reasons. 4
Not surprisingly, the different mix of actors yielded different
outcomes from the RTT. In Poland, for example, the Communist
Party obtained a guarantee that Jaruzelski would become presi-
dent, regardless of electoral behavior. There were to be free elec-
tions to a newly created Senate with 100 Senators. The commu-
nists and their allies were guaranteed 65 percent of the members in
the 460-member Sejm (lower house). In this way, the communists
were also guaranteed a majority (299 members out of 560) in the
joint sessions of the two houses that was to elect the president by
simple majority. Although the communists were not guaranteed
the two-thirds majority in the Sejm needed to overrule a veto of
the Senate, they no doubt thought they would get the extra eight
seats that were needed. In the end, they did not get a single non-
guaranteed seat in the Sejm and received only one seat in the Sen-
ate. Although this worst-case scenario had been built into the com-
promise, its realization came as a shock. In reality, therefore, the
RTT agreement was built on a miscalculation.
In Bulgaria and Hungary, the outcome of the RTT was a set
of electoral procedures that might benefit the Communists, but
only given certain (fallible) assumptions about political behavior.
Consider first Bulgaria. In almost all Eastern European countries
(today's Poland is an exception), the communist parties have advo-
cated majority vote in single-member districts, because their can-
didates are believed to have higher recognition, whereas the oppo-
sition has advocated proportional voting. The Bulgarian
compromise was to let each voter have two votes, one to be cast in
single-member districts and one to be cast for party lists in 28 con-
stituencies. In the negotiations over the presidency, the Commu-
'3 Abstractly, then, the question may be put in terms of three levels of Solidarity par-
ticipation in politics: (i) the minimal level that would satisfy the Western governments, (ii)
the minimal level that would satisfy Solidarity members that they were not selling out to
the Party, and (iii) the maximal level that could satisfy the Party that their monopoly on
power was not in real danger. One interpretation of the events could be that the Party
believed that iii > ii > i, whereas in reality it turned out that ii > iii > i.
" According to Bruszt and Stark, Remaking the Political Field in Hungary (cited in
note 15), foreign labor organizations, including the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Department of
Labor, helped to thwart the hardliners' attempts to restrict union activity in Hungary.
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nists wanted a popularly elected president, since they (wrongly)
believed that the elections to parliament would leave them in a
minority, whereas they might be able to win a majority in presi-
dential elections. They also, therefore, wanted very strong powers
vested in the head of state. The compromise reached was to have a
Communist president elected by the Assembly, but with relatively
weak powers.
In Hungary, a similar although more complicated compromise
was reached on the electoral system.25 In addition, there was an
agreement to have early presidential elections, in which everybody
believed that the Communist candidate Imre Pozsgay would win.
The agreement, however, was undermined by a disastrous miscal-
culation made by the Communist Party: when it dissolved itself to
create a new socialist party, only a small fraction of the former
members joined up. The demoralizing effect of this event was simi-
lar to that of the poor electoral show of the communists in Poland.
In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the RTT essentially
produced a civilized and total capitulation of the communist re-
gimes, with no concessions given to the former elite.
2. Non-RTT countries.
Romania was the only country in which the transition oc-
curred through a violent revolution. The later preparation of the
first free elections (in May 1990) was managed unilaterally by the
National Salvation Front, which also received a large majority in
parliament.
Albania is also unique, in that the country's first free elections
on March 31, 1990 were organized by the Communist Party with-
out any prior negotiations with the opposition. The elections gave
a Communist majority (168 members out of 250) in the new parlia-
ment. The electoral system (adopted by the communists before the
introduction of a multi-party system) was a variant of majority
voting with run-offs. The Democratic Party (the main party in the
opposition) originally fought for proportional voting, but later, as
they gained in confidence, accepted the majority system.
In Croatia, the decision to hold multi-party elections was
made in December 1989-January 1990. Formally, the decision was
taken by the Communist Party, but under strong pressure from
25 John R. Hibbing and Samuel C. Patterson, A Democratic Legislature in the Making:
The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990, Yearbook of the Hungarian Political Science
Association 128 (1990).
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mass demonstration and under the impact of the ongoing
Romanian revolution. The task of drafting the electoral law was
turned over to a committee of experts. The outcome of the election
in April 1990 has been characterized as a "plebiscite against the
communist rule, 26 with the Communists receiving about a quarter
of the votes and of the seats in parliament.
III. THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS
The initial movement away from communist control toward
democracy was just a beginning. The countries now face the task of
creating a blueprint for a stable democratic system. The following
section will first provide an overview of the various countries and
their progress toward creating a constitutional document. Then it
will turn to a general discussion of the issues that all countries face
and the decisionmaking processes that they have adopted to settle
those issues.
A. An Overview of the Various Constitutions
1. Albania.
The official Albanian constitutional draft, which will become
final if it garners the support of two-thirds of parliament, contains
the following provisions, among others. First, the workers have the
right to strike, but only when their legal rights are violated. In
Western systems, of course, this is precisely the case in which they
would not strike but instead address themselves to the courts. The
past also survives in a clause to the effect that educational stan-
dards must be in compliance with a materialistic world outlook.
With regard to the executive, the president is elected by the As-
sembly (by secret ballot and a two-thirds majority) and invested
with important powers, including the authority to set aside govern-
ment decrees as unconstitutional. This clause was probably written
with the current President Alia in mind. 7 The president and the
parliament are elected for five and four years respectively, thus
16 Branko Smerdel, Constitutional Developments in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1989-1991
(Report to the Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The University
of Chicago Law School, Feb 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
17 Although Alia was defeated in the elections to Parliament on March 31, 1991, the
constitutional draft does not require the president to be a member of parliament. Albania
Leader Loses Parliament Seat, Chicago Tribune § 1 at 3 (Apr 1, 1991). I have not had
access to a full translation of the draft. This summary is based on the (very) partial transla-
tion in Louis Zanga, Mixed Fortunes as the New Year Begins, Report on Eastern Europe 1
(Jan 18, 1991).
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creating the possibility of "cohabitation." Given that the Commu-
nists gained one more seat than a two-thirds majority necessary to
adopt the constitution, they will be able to adopt it if they remain
united.
2. Bulgaria.
The Grand National Assembly (Constituent Assembly) has 18
months, from June 1990, to vote in a new constitution, which will
have to be adopted by a two-thirds majority. Although debates in
the Assembly have barely begun, about a dozen different constitu-
tional drafts have been presented.28 The draft written by a mem-
ber of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is modeled on the U.S. Con-
stitution and contains very stringent amendment procedures. The
draft submitted by a group of young, liberal lawyers would grant
strong powers to the president. A draft presented by a member of
parliament from the Union of Democratic Forces (the main opposi-
tional coalition) would grant strong powers to the Constitutional
Court. A draft presented by the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party
(a tiny non-Marxist party) contains various illiberal clauses such as
the obligation to work and freedom of speech restricted by "good
manners." A draft by the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (a pseudo-in-
dependent ally of the Communists) emphasizes positive rights and
restricts personal freedoms. A draft by an independent member of
parliament would give strong powers to the president. And finally,
a draft presented by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (the former
Communist Party) proposes a popularly elected president with
weak prerogatives, together with various restrictions on the free-
dom of speech and assembly.
According to observers, there seems to be general agreement
on a strong President, who would appoint the prime minister; and
on a unicameral assembly. Also, it is likely that parties based on
ethnic, linguistic, and religious criteria will be prohibited, as all the
drafts contain clauses to that effect.29
28 The following draws on Gueorgui Poshtov, Constitutional Debates and Constitu-
tional Changes in Bulgaria (Working Paper, Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in
Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago Law School, Jan 30, 1991); Kjell Engelbrekt,
The Grand Assembly to Adopt a New Constitution, Report on Eastern Europe 5 (Apr 19,
1991).
29 The prohibition may or may not affect the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a
party with 23 members in the Grand Assembly. Although running on a prima facie neutral
platform, the Movement is the de facto party for the Turkish minority.
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3. Czechoslovakia.
The Federal Assembly is currently engaging in patchwork re-
visions of the Constitution."0 At the same time, a constitutional
committee in the Assembly is drafting a whole new charter, to be
adopted before June 1992, that will incorporate some or all of the
earlier patchwork revisions. The Assembly has already adopted a
provisional bill of rights. The Czech and Slovak National Councils
have also appointed committees to draft new constitutions within
the same time limit.3" The most important issue facing the Czecho-
slovak constitution-writers is the relation between the federal and
the republican levels of decisionmaking. In this context, the role of
the 1968 Communist Constitution has turned out to be crucial. 32
Under that document, a certain pre-defined category of important
laws must garner a simple majority both in the 200-member lower
house (elected by proportional voting) and in each of the equal-
sized Czech and the Slovak sections of the 150-member upper
house. Constitutional changes have to pass by a three-fifths major-
ity in the same way. Thus, in theory, 31 members of the upper
house could block all constitutional changes.
Although never implemented under communist rule, this pro-
cedure has now become very important. It obviously confers great
powers on the Slovak deputies. By virtue of their constitution-
making clout, the Slovaks are demanding and getting parity of
power in a number of federal organs.33 The governor of the central
bank will rotate annually between the republics. The constitutional
court will have six members from each republic. The Slovaks have
also succeeded in shifting a number of responsibilities from the
federal to the republican governments, although the provisional
agreements that have been reached often suffer from a great deal
of (probably deliberate) ambiguity. 4 If the final constitution re-
30 Much of the following draws on David Franklin, Constitutional Developments in the
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, November 1989-February 1991 (Working Paper,
Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago
Law School, Mar 1991), and on Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform
in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U Chi L Rev 511 (1991).
31 The final Slovak draft was presented to the Federal Assembly on March 4.
" Before 1989, the Communist Constitution was utterly unimportant, with no power to
constrain behavior. Ironically, it only became important in the process of abolishing
communism.
33As further discussed below at notes 76-77 and accompanying text, the Slovaks are
also resorting to bargaining based on the threat of secession.
I For details, see Jan Obrman and Jiri Pehe, Difficult Power-Sharing Talks, Report on
Eastern Europe 5 (Dec 7, 1990); Jiri Pehe, Power-Sharing Law Approved by Federal As-
sembly, Report on Eastern Europe 6 (Dec 21, 1990).
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tains these vague compromise phrases, the role of the constitu-
tional courts will be enhanced-if unambiguous agreement can be
reached on the competencies of the federal and republican courts.3 5
4. East Germany.
One of the twelve subcommittees of the RTT in East Germany
was devoted to the drafting of a new constitution. 6 The draft is in
many ways similar to the West German Constitution: it proposes a
federal organization, with a government protected by the principle
of constructive vote of no confidence and a strong constitutional
court. It differs from the West German Constitution in its strong
emphasis on protection of the old, the sick, the handicapped, the
unemployed, the homeless, and, uniquely, unmarried couples.
Clearly, it was intended to create a Sozialstaat no less than a
Rechtsstaat. Although the draft had no immediate practical conse-
quences, it has been argued that it may serve an important role in
future German constitutional debates, somewhat like the constitu-
tion of 1848 drafted by the Frankfurt Parliament that was never
implemented.3 7
5. Hungary.
The Hungarian Constitution was continuously amended
throughout 1989 and 1990, until approximately 95 percent of the
clauses had been rewritten.' The revisions took place in a hurry,
with little systematic intention. Any "spirit of constitutionalism"
seems to have been completely absent. An important feature of the
current constitution is that it stipulates a two-thirds majority not
only for amendments of the constitution, but for the passage of
ordinary legislation in a number of designated areas. Electoral
laws, in particular, have this kind of quasi-constitutional status.
The Constitution follows the German model in establishing strong
constitutional courts and in requiring constructive votes of no con-
fidence. After many complications, it was decided virtually by de-
fault (because of very low participation in a referendum on this
11 According to some observers "a fourth court might then be necessary to settle dis-
putes that were bound to arise between the republican and federal ones." Jiri Pehe, Consti-
tutional Court to Be Established, Report on Eastern Europe 9, 10 (Mar 15, 1991).
' Available as Verfassungsentwurf flir die DDR (BasisDruck Verlag, 1990).
11 Preuss, The (Central) Round Table in the Former German Democratic Republic at
46 (cited in note 21).
3' For details see Antal Addm, Tendances du d~veloppement de l'ordre constitutionnel
de Hongrie (Studia Juridica Auctoritate Universitatis Pbcs Publicata, 1990).
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issue) to have the president elected by the assembly rather than by
popular vote.
6. Poland.
On December 19, 1989, Poland enacted several constitutional
amendments that were necessary to bring the constitution into line
with the changed economic and political realities of the country.
Some obsolete clauses remained, however, perhaps by oversight.
Constitutional drafts have been prepared by committees both in
the Sejm and in the Senate.39 In the fall of 1990, the Polish Parlia-
ment passed a law that requires that the new constitution be
passed by two-thirds of the two houses sitting together and then
submitted to a referendum. As of this writing, it is unclear whether
the constitution will be passed by the current parliament or the
one that will emerge from the elections later this year. Most proba-
bly, the latter solution will be chosen.
7. Romania.
The Constituent Assembly had its first session on July 11,
1990. If the Assembly has not adopted a constitution within nine
months of that date, the president can dissolve it with the ap-
proval of the prime minister and of the presidents of the two
houses of the Assembly. If it has not adopted a constitution within
18 months of that date (that is, by January 1992), the president is
under an obligation to dissolve it.
The constitutional committee in parliament has 23 members,
of whom 13 come from the National Salvation Front. There are
two subcommittees: one on rights and liberties, and one on the or-
ganization of the state. The committee presented its preliminary
theses on November 14, 1990. It is in many respects an unprofes-
sional document: eclectic, verbose, rhetorical, and excessively de-
tailed. It is also one of the most illiberal constitutional drafts
presented so far in any Eastern European country, confirming the
general impression that Romania forms the rear guard in the tran-
sition to democracy and that a "second transition" may be needed.
The most hotly debated issue is the proposal by the majority on
the committee to prohibit political parties "founded exclusively on
ethnical, religious or language criteria," a clause that would ex-
" For details on the draft of the committee in the Sejm, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, Con-
stitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish
Parliament, 58 U Chi L Rev 595 (1991).
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clude the Hungarian Democratic Federation (the largest opposition
party).
8. Yugoslavia.
Once again, Yugoslav developments do not lend themselves to
easy summary. The nation made timid constitutional changes in
November 1988 at the federal level.40 In 1989-90, the federal presi-
dency, the federal government, and three of the republics (Bosnia,
Croatia, and Slovenia) prepared constitutional drafts for the feder-
ation. In addition to the federation, the country contains eight
other potential constitution-making bodies: the six republics and
the two autonomous provinces of Kossovo and Voivodina. Until
1989, the latter two had the anomalous and near-contradictory sta-
tus of being both part of the republic of Serbia (their assemblies
must approve any changes in the Serbian Constitution) and repre-
sented on a par with Serbia in the collective Federal executive and
(although with smaller representation) in the Federal Assembly.
(As constitutions never mattered under communism, this contra-
diction had no consequences.) In March 1989, the Serbs abolished
the independence of Kossovo through what can best be described
as a constitutional coup. In July 1990, the (then illegal) parliament
of Kossovo voted a new constitution that made Kossovo into a sep-
arate republic of Yugoslavia. The situation remains fluid, if not
chaotic.
After adopting the requisite constitutional changes, Croatia
held its first multi-party elections in April 1990. On December 21,
1990, the new Croatian assembly adopted the new Constitution of
Croatia, described as a semi-presidential system of government. On
February 21, 1991, Croatia declared by a constitutional amend-
ment that all federal laws are invalid on its territory unless they
accord with the Croatian Constitution. Shortly thereafter, the gov-
ernment of the self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous province
Krajina in Croatia declared Croatian laws invalid on its territory
unless they accorded with the Federal Constitution and with its
own regulations.41
40 Much of the following draws on Branko Smerdel, Constitutional Developments in
Croatia and Yugoslavia 1989-91 (Working Paper, Center for the Study of Constitutionalism
in Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago Law School, Feb 1991).
41 1 know little about constitutional developments in the other republics and provinces.
More generally, the paucity of references to Yugoslovia in the following exposition reflects
both my lack of knowledge about this country and the extreme volitility of the situation
there.
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B. The Issues
It is important to distinguish between constitutions and con-
stitutionalism. The former is a written document; the latter is a
state of mind-an expectation and a norm-in which politics must
be conducted in accordance with standing rules or conventions,
written or unwritten, that cannot be easily changed. Within the
constitution, this spirit of constitutionalism is especially reflected
in the stringency of the amendment procedures and the extent of
checks and balances. Constitutions may exist without constitution-
alism, if they are perceived mainly as policy tools or as instruments
for short-term or partisan interests. Conversely, constitutionalism
may exist without a written constitution, if the unwritten rules of
the game command sufficient agreement. Great Britain is a good
example of the latter situation, for although it has no written con-
stitution, it is often argued that it has an unwritten one.42 Also,
unwritten constitutional conventions may exist in addition to the
written constitution, and supplement it on various points.43
A constitution, considered as a written document, serves three
interrelated functions: to define and protect the rights of the citi-
zens, to establish the machinery of government, and to regulate
changes in the constitution itself. I shall consider these in turn as
they relate to constitutional debates in Eastern Europe.
1. Rights and freedoms.
As a general remark (there are exceptions), many of the
clauses on individual rights in the Eastern European constitutions
or bills of rights have two disturbing features. First, they often
contain the clause that a certain right is guaranteed "unless the
law provides otherwise" or "unless limited by law." Americans dis-
trust such caveats; they place their trust in the judiciary, not the
legislature. Europeans, by contrast, prefer the discretion of a par-
liament to that of a judge who may be under the control of the
executive.44 The implied claim that the judiciary in these countries
4 Vernon Bogdanor, Britain: The Political Constitution, in Vernon Bogdanor, ed, Con-
stitutions in Democratic Politics 53 (Gower, 1988). It has been argued that the violations of
this unwritten constitution under Mrs. Thatcher have created the need for a formal bill of
rights. Larry Siedentop, Thatcherism and the Constitution, Times Lit Supp 88 (Jan 26,
1990).
" In Norway, for instance, the principle of parliamentarism is part of the unwritten
constitution. The written constitution nowhere mentions the mode of appointment of the
prime minister or the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament.
"' For a more detailed discussion of this idea, see Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U Chi L Rev
at 538-44 (cited in note 30).
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is less than fully independent is borne out in several cases. In Hun-
gary, for instance, the former Minister of Justice K61mdn Kulcsr
complained that he had difficulties weaning his officials of the
habit of assigning "reliable" judges to "delicate" cases.45
Second, freedom of speech, assembly, and religion are often
limited by considerations of public health, public morality, and
public security46 (and by the freedoms and rights of others). The
link between religion, public morality, and public health seems es-
pecially mysterious. The Romanian restriction of freedom of reli-
gion by considerations of public morality is apparently motivated
by the existence in nearby Moldavia of religious orders that prac-
tice and advocate licentious sexual behavior. Restrictions by con-
siderations of public health may be an indirect way of outlawing
Islam and Judaism, which practice fasting and circumcision.47
As far as specific rights are concerned, issues of language,
ethnicity, and nationalism loom large. The Bulgarian drafts seem
to be the most illiberal ones, with the Romanian as a close runner-
up. In Bulgaria, minorities are only assured the right to be taught
their own language, as distinct from the more usual right to be
taught in their own language. Among the elite, there seems to be a
universal consensus that it would be too dangerous to allow the
Turkish minority to form a separate party, because of expected
claims for secession and alliance with Turkey. Although it might
be even more dangerous to deny them political rights, and thus
create an oppressed minority waiting for Turkish liberation, this
view does not seem to have a constituency. The idea that political
rights ought to be granted to everyone regardless of such conjec-
tural consequentialist arguments is even more foreign. In the
Romanian constitutional draft, the clause on freedom of speech
4 Kulcsir made the comment at the conference on constitutionalism and the transition
to democracy in Eastern Europe, which was organized by the American Council of Learned
Societies, and held in Pcs, Hungary, June 1990. One solution to this problem might be to
have judges assigned randomly to cases. It might even be worth putting this principle into
the constitution.
4' These observations apply to the Romanian constitutional draft, to the Czechoslovak
Bill of Rights, and to the constitutional draft for the Czech Republic. They do not apply to
the constitutional draft for the Slovak Republic or to the Hungarian constitution.
" Although I have no direct information about the Bulgarian drafts in this respect, the
following observation may be relevant. In Bulgaria, "there'are... public campaigns directed
at two religious practices which, though phrased in terms of their public health implications,
could easily be seen as connecting the campaign against Turkish names with an anti-Islam
campaign. The government has directly called for an end to the Ramadam fast and ritual
circumcision, calling the former 'A Means of Crippling the Individual,' while describing the
latter as 'Criminal Interference with Children's Health.'" Robert J. McIntyre, Bulgaria:
Politics, Economics and Society 73 (Pinter, 1988).
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has sinister caveats that exclude "defamation of the country and
the nation" (no flag burning here!) as well as "national, ethnical
and language exclusivism or separatism."
Similarly repressive provisions have been suggested in
Slovakia, where proposals to make Slovak the compulsory language
in dealing with the administration had to be withdrawn when it
was pointed out that such a clause would violate the Copenhagen
convention and preclude membership of Czechoslovakia in the
Council of Europe.4 8 Later, an agreement on the competencies of
the federation and the republics was reached that shifted responsi-
bility over national and minority affairs to the federal
government.49
Economic rights are also provided for in all constitutions and
constitutional drafts, notably the right to hold private property
and to "full" or "fair" compensation in case of expropriation. The
main exception seems to concern the right to landed property.
When the land is given back to the original owners in Bulgaria and
Albania, for example, it may take the form of a perpetual and in-
heritable lease from the state rather than property in fee, which
would give the feeholder the right to sell the land.
In addition, even though private property is guaranteed, the
right to free entry is not. Only the Hungarian constitution explic-
itly says that the country "has a market economy." More generally,
none of the Eastern European countries has fully confronted the
complex and near-contradictory relations that obtain between eco-
nomic development and constitutional democracyY' Constitutional
guarantees against confiscation and retroactive taxation are needed
to stabilize expectations and create the conditions for long-term
investments. To be credible such guarantees cannot be imposed
dictatorially, as a dictator can always undo by decree what he has
established by decree. Barring exceptions (Chile under Pinochet is
often cited as a counterexample), constitutions need democratic
backing to be credible. On the other hand, democracy can also be
expected to create obstacles for economic development, and the
electorate may turn away from the parties that advocate economic
hardship and sacrifice as a necessary first step towards growth.
Most countries will look to affirmative rights rather than the
market economy to provide economic security for their popula-
48 Jan Obrman, Language Law Stirs Controversy in Slovakia, Report on Eastern Eu-
rope 13-14 (Nov 16, 1990).
49 Pehe, Power-sharing Law Approved by Federal Assembly at 9 (cited in note 34).
50 Elster, When Communism dissolves (cited in note 4).
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tions. The majority of the constitutions affirm positive welfare
rights for the citizens, although often in terms too vague to be en- .
forceable. The Hungarian constitution simply says that "[t]he Re-
public of Hungary sees to the wants of the needy through a long
line of social measures." The Slovak draft constitution affirms that
everyone has a "right to a standard of living commensurate to his
potential and that of society as a whole." The Czech constitutional
draft ensures both the right to work and the right to "adequate
security" in case of "involuntary unemployment" (which the right
to work is supposed to prevent). The Czechoslovak bill of rights
says that "[t]he State shall provide appropriate material security
to those citizens who are unable without their fault to exercise [the
right to acquire the means of his or her livelihood by work]." The
Romanian draft is more concrete, in that it mentions a minimum
wage and the right to unemployment benefits. A proposal for a
minimum wage has also been debated in Poland. The Albanian
draft stipulates the right to unemployment benefits.
To summarize, the most controversial rights-related issues
promise to be the rights of minorities, the right to free alienation
of property, the right to a decent standard of living, and the re-
strictions imposed on the freedom of speech, assembly, and reli-
gion.51 The more general question is whether the legislatures and
courts in Eastern Europe will adopt an attitude toward rights that
is both non-instrumental, thus rendering rights immune to consid-
erations of political expediency, and non-exhortatory, thus ena-
bling them to be enforced in courts.
2. The machinery of government.
The Eastern Europeans have a rich and diverse menu from
which to choose when they draft the constitutional provisions deal-
ing with the machinery of government. Among other things, the
drafters must consider issues of electoral procedures, separation of
powers, checks and balances, and federalism. Then they must
choose the particular devices-bicameralism or unicameralism,
majority vote or proportional vote, presidential or parliamentary
system, and so on-that will work best in their country. Some
combinations of devices and systems are logically impossible;
"1 In addition, a woman's right to choose to have an abortion may well become an issue.
The provisional Czechoslovak Bill of Rights says that "human life deserves protection even
before birth"-a compromise formulation between opponents and advocates of abortion.
The Czech and Slovak Republics may well adopt different attitudes on this issue, and it will
then be up to the constitutional court to decide.
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others obviously unstable; still others may work in some countries
and not in others; and some may work in almost all countries (al-
though not be very good in any) .52 More relevantly for the present
purposes, only a subset of the conceivable constitutional packages
is on the agenda in Eastern Europe. Given that things are very
much in flux, it is hard to generalize. Some propositions, however,
can probably be justified.
None of the countries will choose the American model, with a
president and no prime minister. Nor are there any proposals for
an outright imitation of the French system, in which the prime
minister and a strong, popularly elected president may belong to
different political parties.53
All countries seem to favor the German model of judicial re-
view, based on a powerful constitutional court.
All countries will probably adopt the constructive vote of no
confidence. Under this system, parliament cannot express lack of
confidence in the cabinet unless it simultaneously designates a new
prime minister. This principle-designed by C.J. Friedrich for the
German Constitution of 1848 64-has a stabilizing effect on govern-
ment by preventing irresponsible behavior by parliament.
Proportional voting with thresholds is somewhat more likely
to prevail than single-district majority voting. The thresholds
might be national, or in the federally organized countries, republi-
can only. In the 1990 Czechoslovak elections, for example, a party
needed 5 percent in one of the two republics to be represented in
Parliament. For the purpose of favoring the formation of national
parties, national thresholds are obviously preferable.
Finally, all countries will probably vest more than merely sym-
bolic and representative powers in the presidency. As a very rough
generalization, powers of the presidency may be expected to grow
as we move from West to East, although Poland may provide a
counterexample.
61 My criteria for what "works" are 1) that no actor or institution can usurp power; and
2) that the system is able to make decisions and stick to them. Or, to put it negatively, that
the system avoids both tyranny and deadlock. Juan Linz has suggested to me that there are
three criteria: 1) that the government has an opportunity to govern; 2) that the people have
an opportunity to control; and 3) that those who bring the government down must pay a
price for doing so.
"1 Note that a discrepancy in the party affiliation of the president and the prime minis-
ter may come about either because the periods of election differ or because voters vote for a
presidential candidate different from the one promoted by the party they favor. The Alba-
nian proposal, described above, falls in the first category. See Part III.A.1. The French sys-
tem belongs to both.
Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic at 81-82 (cited in note 1).
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As a more vulnerable generalization, the countries seem to
look in equal parts to France and to West Germany, the former
providing them with a model of a strong presidency, and the latter
with a model for a strong, government (due to the constructive vote
of no confidence) and a strong constitutional court. Strong parlia-
mentary regimes, therefore, are somewhat unlikely to emerge.
3. Amendment procedures.
The procedures for revising the constitdtion are closely con-
nected with the general spirit of constitutionalism." The more dif-
ficult it is to change the constitution, the more people tend to view
it as a given framework for action rather than as an instrument for
action. Of course, the people may also come to see it as an insup-
portable prison, thus there is a-need for an optimal degree of rigid-
ity of the constitution. (As constitutional lawyers say, the constitu-
tion is not a suicide pact.) In Eastern Europe, the general tendency
seems to be toward majoritarianism-be it in a presidential or par-
liamentary form-rather than constitutionalism.5 6 Legitimacy is
vested in a parliament elected by majority vote or in a directly
elected president, not in standing rules.
To strike the right balance between rigidity and flexibility, a
number of devices can be used, singly or in combination. First, one
can require qualified majorities for changes in the constitution.
The purpose is to guard against instability, thus ensuring that the
constitution remains unaffected even if majorities fluctuate be-
tween 49 and 51 percent.5 7
Second, one can impose delaying or "cooling" devices. For ex-
ample, a system could require that changes be passed by two suc-
cessive parliaments. The purpose of this solution is especially close
to the spirit of constitutionalism: delays protect society against it-
self, by forcing passionate majorities, whether simple or qualified,
to cool down and reconsider .5
55 See notes 43-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of amendment procedures,
see Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Theory, in George Loewenstein and Jon
Elster, eds, Choices over Time (Russell Sage, forthcoming 1992).
5 I am indebted to Wiktor Osiatynski for this formulation.
6' Another effect of qualified majorities may be to eliminate the problem of cyclical
majorities. If we assume Arrow's condition of unlimited domain, qualified majorities do not
eliminate the problem of cycling. If, however, we impose certain weak constraints on the
admissible combinations of individual preferences, qualified majorities prevent cycles from
arising. Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff, On 64% Majority Rule, 56 Econometrica 787
(1988).
58 If we limit ourselves to qualified majorities and delays in non-federal systems, Nor-
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Third, federally organized countries can require that any
changes be passed by all, or a qualified majority, of the republics.
The purpose is to protect the individual republics against the fed-
eral government. (As in the United States, this solution may also
serve as a delaying device.)
Fourth, constitutional changes may be taken out of the hands
of parliament and be delegated to specially convened assemblies.
The purpose is to prevent the legislative assembly from being
judge in its own cause, and to shift the amendment power to an
independent body with no special interests to defend or promote.
Fifth, changes might have to be approved by referendum, perhaps
with a qualified majority. This solution serves much the same pur-
pose as the previous one. Finally, some clauses may not be subject
to amendment at all. The purpose of such unamendable clauses is,
I believe, mainly symbolic.
In the current constitutional debates in Eastern Europe, only
the qualified majority and republic approval solutions are seriously
discussed. With the exception of two of the more marginal Bulga-
rian drafts, delaying devices are not advocated. Under the current,
rapidly changing circumstances, this neglect is probably unavoida-
ble and, in fact, desirable. For these societies, it could be disas-
trous to become locked into a set of institutions that do not fit
their needs. One has to be aware, however, of the dilemma thus
created. The constitution will lose many of its desirable proper-
ties-notably that of inspiring confidence and creating a climate in
which investors are willing to make long-term investments-if ev-
eryone expects that it will be continually revised. One might object
that the clauses that are necessary to inspire confidence need not
be among those actually subject to this constant revision. However,
the very fact that they are relatively unprotected might in itself
destroy confidence. In any case, the constitution is a whole that
exercises its effects on society as a bloc, not through its individual
parts.
C. The Constitution-making Process
To understand the emerging constitutions in Eastern Europe,
we must study the process by which they come into being: the
way has both; Sweden only the latter; Hungary only the former; and New Zealand has
neither. See Joseph Jaconelli, Majority Rule and Special Majorities, Public Law 587 (Win
1989); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J 379, 415-19.
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forces that shape the constituent assembly and the processes in the
assembly that shape the constitution.59
1. Creating the assembly.
First, a constituent assembly has to be set up, whether by elec-
tion (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania) or by self-constitution (Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia). The genesis of the constituent assembly
may be crucial for its legitimacy and for the legitimacy of the doc-
ument produced. With a suitably democratic pedigree, the consti-
tution stands a better chance of being ratified and respected. How-
ever, the case of Hungary shows that a democratically-elected
constituent assembly is not a necessary condition for the produc-
tion of a relatively uncontested constitution. Most of the provi-
sions in the current Hungarian constitution were adopted before
the first free elections on March 25, 1990. Unlike what happened in
Czechoslovakia, there was no pre-election purge of communist
members of the assembly. Nevertheless, to my knowledge no objec-
tions have been made to the constitution based on the make-up of
the enacting body.
In Poland, the situation is more ambiguous. In this case, too,
pre-election purges were eschewed. The former communists still
form a majority in the Sejm, and even dominate the subcommittee
on institutional affairs of the committee that is charged with draft-
ing the constitution. Fears that their presence might bias the out-
come of the committee proved unfounded, however, as the expert
advisers did most of the work.60 (As the members of the Senate
were chosen in free elections, one might expect the draft of the
Senate subcommittee to enjoy greater prominence than that of the
Sejm. Interestingly, the Senate committee did not play an impor-
tant role."1) The process illustrates the importance of technical
competence in modern constitution-making, to the point where it
may become not just a necessary but even a sufficient condition for
having influence.2 At one point, Bronislaw Geremek, the chair of
, The following discussion draws extensively on Elster, The Constitution-Making Pro-
cess (cited in note 8).
60 This passage draws on Rapaczynski, 58 U Chi L Rev at 602-04 (cited in note 39).
01 See id at 602.
It is interesting to note that the constituent committee of the Spanish assembly in
1977 deliberately chose not to create an advisory group of experts. Jos6 Pedro P~rez-Llorca,
Commentary, in Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds, Constitution Makers on Consti-
tution Making 266, 272 (AEI, 1988). It is widely agreed that the Spanish constitution is
deficient from a technical point of view, with a number of verbose and ambiguous clauses.
Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy at 87, 97, 103 (cited in note 2); Francisco
Rubio Llorente, The Writing of the Constitution of Spain, in Goldwin and Kaufman, eds,
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the Sejm's constitutional committee, argued that the new constitu-
tion might also be adopted by the current legislature. "Some peo-
ple say that this parliament should not create the new constitu-
tion. Nonetheless, I think that if [this parliament] has adopted 100
laws to change the system, then it has the legitimacy to adopt the
constitution as well." 63 It seems more likely, however, that the con-
stitution will be adopted by the next legislature, because of the
ambiguities still attached to the sitting one.
In Czechoslovakia, the pre-election assembly obtained the nec-
essary legitimacy by purging itself of some 100 communist mem-
bers and replacing them by co-optation, a procedure that was
grounded in the existing constitution. In Bulgaria and Romania,
the legitimacy of the constituent assemblies is weak, and the con-
stitutions that emerge may similarly lack legitimacy. In both of
these countries, elections were called so early that the opposition
parties had little time to organize. Although direct fraud was prob-
ably marginal, the communists used their strong organization to
browbeat ignorant voters in the countryside. In Bulgaria, the out-
come was to some extent shaped by the electoral laws that were
agreed on in the RTT. The dubious legitimacy enjoyed by those
talks today might easily be passed along to the electoral laws, the
constituent assembly, and the constitution.
2. Decisionmaking in the assembly.
The proceedings of the assembly can be analyzed through two
distinctions. First, I shall distinguish between impartiality and in-
terest as motives animating the constitution-makers. Second, I
shall distinguish between arguing and bargaining as the two main
forms of constitutional speech acts. Although it might seem that
impartiality goes naturally with arguing and interest with bargain-
ing, the reality is more complicated. A study of earlier constitu-
tion-making processes shows that all four possible combinations of
these factors occur quite frequently.
Constitution Makers on Constitution Making 239, 259, 263. Had lawyers been more closely
involved, the document would probably have been straightened out. It is not obvious, how-
ever, that this would have been a good thing. Sometimes, ambiguity and vagueness are es-
sential for reaching agreement. Also, lawyers may not limit themselves to straightening out
messy formulations; they may, inadvertently or deliberately, impose substantive views of
their own.
" Louisa Vinton, The Debate over the "Political Calendar", Report on Eastern Europe
13 (Nov 2, 1990).
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a) Interest and impartiality. Although the distinction be-
tween interest and impartiality is clear enough in theory, it is often
blurred in practice. In arguing from one of these motives, framers
are often constrained by the other. Even the most impartial fram-
ers may have to anticipate and internalize the interests of the
groups that are to ratify the constitution. Conversely, even the
most self-interested of framers must respect the norms of imparti-
ality and consistency that regulate public debate.
The first constraint is illustrated by the debates about the role
of the Senate under the future Polish constitution.6 4 There may
not have been any good impartial arguments for retaining this in-
stitution in the government. However, given that the Senate as an
institution was very popular, and considering that it had to give its
blessings to the new constitution, it was unthinkable for the sub-
committee of the Sejm to simply abolish it. And in the end, the
subcommitte did not propose its abolition. Assuming the subcom-
mittee was wholly motivated by impartial concerns, it was still
constrained by the interests of those who were to ratify the
constitution."5
To a large extent, the subcommittee of the Sejm seems actu-
ally to have been motivated by impartial concerns. 6 Although I
lack reliable knowledge about what has gone on inside other con-
stitutional committees and assemblies, I conjecture that such genu-
inely impartial reasoning is rare. It seems clear that the prohibition
of ethnically-based parties contained in the majority draft of the
Romanian constitution is aimed at the Hungarian Democratic Fed-
eration. The jockeying for electoral position that took place in the
RTT of the various countries is likely to repeat itself in the consti-
tutional debates. Large parties and parties with highly visible can-
didates are likely to favor majority voting or proportional voting
with high thresholds. The large parties that are most likely to form
a government will push strongly for a constructive vote of no confi-
dence. Parties who have a popular presidential candidate are likely
The following draws on and summarizes Rapazcynski, 58 U Chi L Rev at 614-16
(cited in note 39).
"I At the American Constitutional Convention, several delegates argued that the consti-
tution ought to be tailored so as to be acceptable to the state legislatures because they
assumed that the legislatures would be ratifying the document. Max Farrand, ed, 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention 132, 374 (Yale, 1966). Others of course successfully ar-
gued against the idea that the constitution should be ratified by the legislatures given that
the legislatures stood to lose much of their power if the Constitution was adopted. Id at 123.
88 See Rapacyznski, 58 U Chi L Rev at 615-16 (cited in note 39). Note, however, that he
does cite the self-interest of committee members from the old regime as the explanation for
why electoral laws are not included in the draft.
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to argue for popular election of the president, whereas the other
parties will vote for election by the assembly and try to limit the
powers of the presidency as much as possible.
With respect to the last issue, the current Polish debates over
the powers of the president may be seen as a reenactment of the
1919-21 constitutional Sejm. At that time, it was widely expected
that Joseph Pilsudski would be elected president under the new
constitution. Perceiving Pilsudski both as a socialist and as a
strong personality, the conservative Sejm wrote a weak presidency
into the constitution-so weak, in fact, that Pilsudski, preferring
to bide his time, refused to stand for election. Today, one school of
thought argues that the Poles, fearing the strong personality of
President Walesa, will write a weak presidency into the new consti-
tution. Others argue that the assembly, being under the pressure of
that strong personality, will accommodate him by giving him large
powers. Similarly ambiguous feelings may exist with respect to
President Havel in Czechoslovakia.
However, these self-interested arguments are constrained by
the norm of impartiality. In one sense, the idea of self-interested
argument is meaningless. Arguments have to be stated in impartial
terms, as if one were arguing for the public good and not for one's
own self-interest. To persuade others that society ought to be or-
ganized so as to accommodate a particular set of private interests
one must either back the claim by a credible threat or argue that
this arrangement will in fact serve a more impartial end that com-
mands general acceptance. One cannot say, "I want this outcome
because it is good for me," and expect others to be persuaded.
There simply is no language game of that kind. When I refer to a
self-interested argument, therefore, I have in mind utterances
whose ultimate but unstated motivation is the self-interest of the
speaker. That motivation may be transparent to others, but it can-
not be stated.
Consider again the choice between proportional and majority
voting. On the one hand, proportional voting can be backed by
powerful arguments from democratic theory and the rights of the
electorate. On the other hand, majority voting tends to yield more
stable and efficient government. Similarly, there are strong fairness
arguments both for equal representation and proportional repre-
sentation of the states in a federal system.6 7 A proposal for a con-
67 At the Federal Convention, one delegate argued that any scheme that would give
some states no representation in the Senate would be "unfair." Farrand, ed, 1 Records of
the Federal Convention at 159 (cited in note 65). James Madison argued that any deviation
from proportional representation was "unjust." Id at 151.
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stitutional clause that could have no other justification besides
that of favoring one party would not be taken seriously-as long as
we are in the context of public discussion rather than private
bargaining.
b) Rhetorical use of historic and contemporary constitu-
tions. Impartial arguments-whether genuine or spurious-are of
two kinds: rights-based and efficiency-based. Arguments for pro-
portional voting, for instance, typically appeal to rights, whereas
arguments for majority voting invoke the need for stable and effi-
cient government. I shall not discuss the variations on these two
kinds of argument, but focus on -one issue that is especially rele-
vant for Eastern Europe: how can constitution-makers assess the
consequences of various institutional arrangements? One answer is
that because we cannot know, we should assume the worst. An-
other-the one I shall pursue here-is to look to contemporary and
earlier constitutions to find out what seems to work. In constitu-
tional debates, one invariably finds a large number of references to
other constitutions, as models to be imitated, as disasters to be
avoided, or simply, as evidence for certain views about human
nature.""
Consider first the rhetorical use of the past. In most Eastern
European countries today, there is a tendency to look to. the pre-
communist constitutions as sources of inspiration. 9 These earlier
documents may serve as focal points; they allow the constitution-
makers to single out the most salient among the innumerable mod-
els that could be adopted. They may serve as a source of experi-
ence that is particularly relevant because of the sociological con-
tinuity with the past. They may be used symbolically, to affirm the
continuity of the nation over time. Finally, they may be used as
rationalizations of conclusions reached on other grounds. Those
who cite the existence of a Polish Senate in the pre-communist
constitution as an argument for writing it into the new one may in
reality be moved by tactical and partisan concerns.
"8 For these distinctions, see Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Con-
stitution ch 4 (Oxford, 1987).
" For a discussion of the role of the past in Hungarian constitutional developments, see
K6bmim Kulcsfir, Old Constitutions and the New Ones: The Problem of Continuity of Con-
stitution in East-Central Europe 14-33 (paper for colloquium "Learning from the Past:
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe," Norwegian Academy of Science, Dec 1990) (on file
with U Chi L Rev).
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Consider next the use of contemporary models.7 0 The coun-
tries in Eastern Europe strongly feel the pull of the constitutions
in Western Europe, especially those of France and Germany that
are widely regarded as very successful. Because of geographical
proximity, the Albanians are also looking toward Greece and Italy.
There is a danger, however, that some of these countries may end
up writing their constitutions a la carte, believing they can take
the best from each of several constitutions and ignoring the fact
that constitutions have their effect through the totality of inter-
locking clauses rather than through their individual parts.7 '
Impartial arguments based on both historic and contemporary
constitutional models have yielded a variety of results in Eastern
Europe. In Albania, for instance, the trend seems to be toward a
strong president (French model) elected by the assembly (German
model). It is not at all clear that this system could work under all
circumstances. However, the dangers of eclecticism do not provide
an argument for the wholesale adoption of another constitution.
Because of differences in the extra-constitutional environment, an
arrangement that works well in one country can be disastrous in
another, as shown by the failed attempts to transplant the United
States Constitution to other countries.
A fairly robust generalization seems to be that constitution-
makers are more influenced by past disasters than by past suc-
cesses. The Framers in Philadelphia had learned a great deal from
the pathologies of the various state constitutions. The constitution
of the Fifth French Republic was explicitly designed to prevent the
parliamentary chaos that had reigned under the Fourth. The West
German framers in 1948 "looked at the Weimar era in the same
light in which the fifty-five men at Philadelphia regarded the years
following the War of Independence: as a period of anarchy during
which the governmental institutions had fallen too much under the
sway of popular whim and fancy, '7 2 a situation to be avoided at all
costs. The main reason why these recent failures matter so much
seems to be that they guide the construction of worst-case scenar-
ios. Caution comes naturally to many constitution-makers. How-
ever, there are a great many bad things that could happen-chaos,
tyranny, deadlock. Recent failures have the effect of lending spe-
70 On the general issue of legal (not just constitutional) borrowing, see Eric Stein, Uses,
Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw U L Rev 198 (1977).
71 This statement is somewhat exaggerated. The various rights are to a large extent
independent of each other.
71 Merkl, The Creation of the West German Republic at 81 (cited in note 1).
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cial salience to one of these scenarios. In Eastern Europe, one
might think that memories of communism would single out the
fear of a strong executive as the most potent one. Although there
are some signs of this effect, notably in Hungary, it does not ap-
pear to be universally present.
c) Arguing and bargaining. To argue is to engage in com-
munication for the purpose (or apparent purpose) of persuading
an opponent, i.e., to make the other change his beliefs about fac-
tual or normative matters. Statements asserted in a process of ar-
guing are made with a claim to being valid. To bargain is to engage
in communication for the purpose of forcing or inducing the oppo-
nent to accept one's claim. To achieve this end, bargainers rely on
threats and promises, to be executed within or outside the assem-
bly itself. Bargaining power does not derive from the power of the
better argument, but from material resources, manpower, votes,
and the like. Statements asserted in a process of bargaining must
be credible; bargainers must try to make their opponents believe
that they would carry out any threats or promises that they make.
In the category of bargaining I also include disguised threats and
pseudo-warnings, as defined above.
We may distinguish between intra-constituent bargaining or
logrolling, and extra-constituent bargaining based on resources
other than votes. Logrolling is a form of exchange, in which each
party makes a concession on a less valuable issue to gain on one
that matters more to him."3 It is also a form of bargaining, since it
is based on the threat of voting according to one's preferences on
one issue unless the other side votes against his preferences on an-
other. Extra-constituent bargaining makes essential reference to
events outside the constituent assembly, by stating one's intention
to harm the other party, in his purse or body or otherwise, unless
certain demands are satisfied.
An example of logrolling in Eastern Europe was a deal reputed
to have been struck in Yugoslavia: Croatia and Slovenia would ab-
stain from interfering with Serbian repression in Kossovo if the
Serbs would let them go their way to independence. It would be
surprising if such exchanges did not play a major role in the closed
"' Logrolling might be defined more broadly. Thus Brian Barry, Political Argument 318
(Humanities, 1965), includes the case of "rational egoists [who] would, under a unanimity
system, misrepresent their preferences and commit themselves to vote against things they
really wanted in order to get a bribe as well." I shall assume, however, that preferences are
known.
[58:447
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe
sessions that are now taking place in other Eastern European
capitals. By the nature of the case, however, hard evidence is hard
to come by.74
Extra-constituent bargaining can be bilateral or unilateral. In
bilateral bargaining, each of two sides has extra-constitutional
forces at its disposal. For example, the Round Table Talks in Hun-
gary and Poland were torn between the fear of Soviet intervention
and the risk of mass demonstrations. Today, many of the Eastern
European countries are caught between the demands of the inter-
national community on the one hand and popular nationalism and
opposition to foreign ownership on the other. If they do not write a
full set of human rights into their constitutions they will be denied
membership in the Council of Europe, and membership is a de
facto condition for aid from the Economic Community. If they do
not write strong guarantees for property and contract into their
constitutions, they may not get assistance from the International
Monetary Fund. Some of the political actors may deliberately play
on these international bodies, by issuing warnings (or pseudo-
warnings?) about the disastrous effects of yielding to popular de-
mands. Other actors may equally deliberately play on the fear of
mass demonstrations, by issuing warnings (or disguised threats?)
that rigorous policies will unleash popular riots.
In Czechoslovakia, we find unilateral extra-constituent bar-
gaining using the threat or warning of secession. As mentioned ear-
lier, Slovakia has been able to obtain parity of power in many
parts of the federal system as well as considerable autonomy for
the republic. To say, as I did, that these results have been obtained
because the country retained the communist constitution is true,
but insufficient, because we must also explain why the rules of the
game were not changed to reflect the demographics of the country.
' Logrolling is a form of across-issue compromise. Within-issue compromise, illustrated
by the electoral laws in Bulgaria and Hungary, is also important. In explaining the form
within-issue compromises take, extra-constituent factors are often important. At the Federal
Convention, the Connecticut Compromise was not the only possible one. Proposals were also
made to strike a compromise within the Senate itself, by which the representation of the
smaller states would go beyond proportionality but fall short of equality. Farrand, ed, 1
Records of the Federal Convention at 405, 488-89, 510-11 (cited in note 65). A system of
this kind was actually adopted in the West German constitution of 1948. In The Constitu-
tion-Making Process (cited in note 8), I argue that extra-constituent bargaining power could
explain why the small states obtained full rather than truncated equality.
' There are actually two different scenarios that could occur. In one, populist and na-
tionalist groups play on the masses to obtain illiberal concessions. In another, democratic
forces play on the masses to obtain liberal concessions. The former was illustrated by the
Romanian events in June 1990, the latter by events in Bulgaria throughout 1990.
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Three explanations come to mind: the desire for a legitimate tran-
sition, the lack of time to adopt a new constitution, and the focal-
point quality of the constitution in place.
However, the most important cause may be that the Slovaks
backed their demands with a threat of secession. Some political
leaders in Slovakia genuinely strive for secession.76 Other (and
more responsible) politicians who do not share this goal have nev-
ertheless used the threat of secession as a bargaining chip, and
with some success." It is possible that the former have been the
unwitting tools of the latter. The Slovak leaders who negotiated
with the Czech and federal governments may have been issuing
warnings rather than threats: unless you give in to our demands,
the nationalist drive for secession will become irresistible. This hy-
pothesis seems to make better sense than the threat hypothesis, as
it is hard to see how a threat of secession would be credible. The
question then arises whether these were genuine warnings or
pseudo-warnings. In the latter case, we may further ask whether
the Slovak leaders might not find themselves in the situation of
the sorcerer's apprentice. Nationalist feeling is a force that lends
itself badly to fine tuning.
CONCLUSION
The main difficulty of the constitution-makers in Eastern Eu-
rope is that they are operating in a complete vacuum. There are no
ground rules; everything is up for arguing and bargaining. The
framers have too much freedom, too many possibilities to choose
from, and too many decisions to make simultaneously. Even the
actors have to be created, because there are so few well-organized
political parties. In these countries, the metaphysical fact that any
assembly is made up of individuals will also be a political reality.
Two questions therefore arise. First, what are the mechanisms by
which the number of alternatives might be reduced, so as to make
meaningful choices possible? Second, what are the mechanisms by
which the number of actors might be reduced, so as to facilitate
the formation of stable coalitions?
With regard to limiting the number of alternatives, the experi-
ence of the West German Constituent Assembly in 1948 is inform-
ative, for it involved a case of constitution-making in a country
71 Jiri Pehe, Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat ta Federation, Report on East-
em Europe 1 (Mar -22, 1991).
7 Pehe, Power-sharing Law Approved by Federal Assembly at 6 (cited in note 34).
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that had recently emerged from totalitarian rule. The Assembly's
constitution-making was much facilitated by the fact that the oc-
cupying powers imposed the mode of election of the delegates and
the mode of ratification by the Lander. The constitution-making
task was also simplified by the knowledge that the occupying pow-
ers would veto any non-consensual or dogmatic proposal. The clos-
est analogy for the Eastern European countries today is the inter-
national community. One hope for the constitution-making process
is that the European Community, the Council of Europe, and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will exercise a
salutary constraining influence.
In the presence of multiple alternatives, differing across multi-
ple dimensions, choice is also facilitated if there is one uniquely
salient arrangement that stands out from the others. In some East-
ern European countries, the pre-communist constitutions may well
assume this focal-point quality. In others, the strong pull of the
German Constitution may be decisive.
With respect to limiting the number of actors, the action of
the international community may prove important here as well.
Social Democrat and Christian Democrat parties in Western Eu-
rope can to some extent facilitate the process of party formation in
Eastern Europe. The pre-communist party structure might also
serve as a matrix for party formation. The Hungarian case illus-
trates the fragility of this mechanism, however.78 In the long run,
the choice of electoral laws will probably be the most important
factor in promoting a small number of stable political parties. In
the short run, however, these laws are part and parcel of the con-
stitutional package to be adopted.
The most important obstacle to constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe has already been identified above: for countries undergoing
rapid social and economic change, commitment to standing rules
may not be desirable. At the Federal Convention, George Mason
observed that "[t]hough he had a mortal hatred to paper money,
yet as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie
the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could
78 "The Independent Smallholder's Party and the Social Democratic Party are so-called
historical parties that existed until 1948. The initially strong showing of both parties in the
polls suggested that people welcomed their revival. Soon after they had been established,
however, infighting began, primarily over the issue of personnel; many party members who
had been active before 1948 wanted to monopolize important positions within the parties."
Zoltan D. Barany, The State of the Parties as Elections Approach, Report on Eastern Eu-
rope 23 (Mar 16, 1990).
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not have been carried on, had such a prohibition existed. ' '19 The
future of many Eastern European countries may prove to be a suc-
cession of such emergencies, in which constitutional self-binding
might be disastrous. The potentially tragic dilemma is that the fu-
ture without a constitution to regulate expectations and behavior
might be equally bleak.
Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 309 (cited in note 65).
